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IMPLICATIONS OF FULL-BODY SCANNERS  
IN PREFLIGHT SCREENING 
 
By M. Madison Taylor∗ 
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Fourth Amendment Implication of Full-Body Scanners in 
Preflight Screening, XVII RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2010), 
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“The means of defence agst. [sic] foreign danger, have been always the 
instruments of tyranny at home.” 
- James Madison1 
 
“[T]he public does have . . .  under our Constitution the right to expect, 
that no matter the threat, the search to counter it will be as limited as 
possible, consistent with meeting the threat.”  
- Judge James L. Oakes2 
 
 
 
 
                                                
∗ J.D., University of Mississippi School of Law (expected 2011); B.S., Biology, Wheaton 
College (IL). I am indebted to Professor Thomas K. Clancy for his guidance and for his 
excellent treatise on the Fourth Amendment. This article would not be possible without 
the love and support of my wife, Liz, for which I am truly grateful. I dedicate this Article 
to my legal hero, Judge Mike Taylor. 
 
1 James Madison, Remarks at the Constitutional Convention (June 29, 1787), in 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 465 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
 
2 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] In the face of emerging technology, the Fourth Amendment’s 
guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures3 is 
especially susceptible to erosion.  As Justice Scalia wrote in Kyllo v. 
United States, “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy 
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected 
by the advance of technology.”4  In Katz v. United States, technology 
compelled a dramatic shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment.5  Prior to Katz, the Court generally interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment to prevent only the search and seizure of tangible 
things, and looked to areas of the common law, such as trespass, to 
determine whether government action violated Fourth Amendment rights.6  
Katz marked a transition from the limited protection of tangible property 
to a broader concept of privacy.7   
 
[2] The advent of full-body scanners in airports presents complex and 
novel Fourth Amendment issues. The fact that the Supreme Court has 
never decided a case involving the constitutionality of preflight screening, 
leaving the circuits with little guidance on how to resolve such cases, 
underscores the significance of these issues.8   
                                                
3 See U.S. CONST. amend IV (guaranteeing that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.”). 
 
4 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001). 
 
5 See 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 
6 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (“The amendment itself shows 
that the search is to be of material things-the person, the house, his papers, or his 
effects.”). 
 
7 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 359 (“The fact that the electronic device employed to 
[conduct the search] did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no 
constitutional significance. . . . Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he 
will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 
8 See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 959 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
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[3] There are two types of full-body scanners currently used to 
conduct pre-flight screenings: millimeter wave and backscatter x-ray 
devices.9  These technologies are collectively referred to as “full-body 
scanners,” “whole-body imaging,” or “advanced imaging technology.”10  
At present, airport security performs full-body scans only on consenting 
passengers (inasmuch as consent to the method of mandatory screening is 
“voluntary”).11 
 
[4] Not surprisingly, a bill introduced in the Senate on June 24, 2010 
sought to mandate the use of full-body scanners for primary screening 
throughout the nation’s airports.12  It is a fair inference that the Department 
of Homeland Security intends this technology not merely to supplement 
current preflight screening systems, but to supplant them.13  The 
                                                
 
9 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR TSA 
WHOLE BODY IMAGING 2 (2009) [hereinafter PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI], available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/ privacy_pia_tsa_wbiupdate.pdf. 
 
10 See id. (using “Whole Body Imaging (WBI) technologies” in reference to both 
millimeter wave and backscatter x-ray devices); Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), 
Innovation & Technology, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech 
/ait/index.shtm (last visited Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter AIT] (using “imaging 
technology” in reference to millimeter wave and backscatter x-ray devices). 
 
11 See Privacy, Advanced Imaging Technology, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/ privacy.shtm (last visited Aug. 26, 2010) 
[hereinafter Privacy]. 
 
12 See Securing Aircraft From Explosives Responsibly: Advanced Imaging Recognition 
Act of 2010, S. 3536, 111th Cong. (2010).  The bill provides in part: 
 
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that advanced 
imaging technology and other advanced technology with the capability 
to detect weapons, on-body plastic explosives, and other nonmetallic 
explosives, are deployed, individually or in combination with each 
other, in a timely and effective manner for the primary screening of 
aircraft passengers in accordance with this subsection. 
 
Id. § 4. 
 
13 Using full-body imaging devices solely for secondary screening creates a loophole: 
passengers carrying non-metal contraband who escape detection by Behavior Detection 
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implications raised under the proposed mandatory use of full-body 
scanning technology during preflight screening require the Court, once 
again, to determine “what limits there are upon [the] power of technology 
to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”14 
 
[5] This Article analyzes the potential implications of using full-body 
imaging devices in a non-voluntary context.  Part II discusses the 
historical trajectory of preflight screening.  Part III summarizes other 
methods of preflight screening.  Part IV discusses full-body scanners and 
the unique dangers they pose to Fourth Amendment guarantees.  Part V 
then surveys the various approaches the Supreme Court may take when 
analyzing the reasonableness of full-body scanners in the preflight context.  
Finally, Part VI argues that the use of full-body imaging scanners as 
primary screening methods in airports is wholly unreasonable, and that 
airport security should use fully-body scanners only for secondary 
screening where probable cause exists. 
 
II. THE ORIGINS OF PREFLIGHT SCREENING 
 
[6] Preflight, suspicionless security screening measures were first 
implements in the 1960s and 1970s.15  Noting the epidemic of airplane 
hijackings and terrorist activity, courts generally blessed entranceway 
searches in airports, government buildings, and similar places.16  Since the 
beginning of preflight screening, particularly after the deadly hijackings of 
                                                
Officers and successfully pass the magnetometer may evade even a request for a full-
body scan.  See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.  Certainly, the TSA believes 
these machines are best suited to primary screening, raising the possibility that 
passengers will become accustomed to their presences and dulled to their intrusiveness 
over time. 
 
14 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 
15 Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 
DUKE L.J. 843, 850 (2010). 
 
16 Id. at 851-52; see, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Davis, 
482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 
1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972). 
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September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), the scope of suspicionless searches has 
expanded, with new methods and technologies gaining similar judicial 
approval.17  In late 2001, in response to the 9/11 attacks, the now 
ubiquitous Transportation Safety Administration (“TSA”) assumed control 
of airport security.18  The TSA, now “responsible for security in all modes 
of transportation,”19 mandates the screening of all passengers before they 
enter the sterile area or board the aircraft.20 
 
III. STANDARD PASSENGER SCREENING METHODS 
 
[7] A transportation safety officer (“TSO”) screens all passengers 
before they can gain access to the sterile area beyond the first 
checkpoint.21  Preflight screening is divided into two stages: primary 
screening, which all passengers undergo, and secondary screening, which 
is reserved for passengers who fail primary screening.22  The procedures 
for screening checked and carry-on baggage also have Fourth Amendment 
implications; however, discussion of those issues is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  
 
 
 
                                                
17 See, e.g., Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 73, 87 (2d Cir. 2006); MacWade v. Kelly, 
460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Kyle P. Hanson, Note, Suspicionless 
Terrorism Checkpoints Since 9/11: Searching for Uniformity, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 171, 
172 (2007). 
 
18 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 114 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010). 
 
19 Id. § 114(d). 
 
20 See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(2) (“No person may . . . [e]nter, or be present within, a . . .  
sterile area without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures being applied to 
control access to, or presence or movement in, such areas.”).  See also id. §1540.5 
(“Sterile area means a portion of an airport defined in the airport security program that 
provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which the access generally is 
controlled by TSA . . . through the screening of persons and property.”). 
 
21 See PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 2. 
 
22 See id. 
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A. Primary Screening Methods 
 
[8] After surrendering their carry-on baggage for an x-ray machine 
inspection, passengers undergo the first preflight screening: the 
magnetometer walkthrough.23  Passengers walk through the doorframe-
like device, which sounds an alarm if the passenger has an amount of 
metal above the calibration of the machine.24  Passengers cannot perceive 
the magnetic field, and the search is nearly instantaneous.  Additionally, 
the magnetometer merely indicates the presence or absence of a threshold 
amount of metal on the passenger.25  Therefore, magnetometer searches 
are minimally invasive. 
  
[9] The TSA also deploys specially trained agents to execute a process 
called Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (“SPOT”).26  
The SPOT program is based on the Facial Action Coding System 
(“FACS”) developed by psychologists in 1978.27  The technique involves 
Behavior Detection Officers (“BDOs”) vigilantly watching for passengers 
who elicit a threshold degree of suspicion.28  BDOs are “trained to detect 
                                                
23 See Julie Solomon, Comment, Does the TSA Have Stage Fright? Then Why Are They 
Picturing You Naked?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 643, 646-47 (2008). 
 
24 See id. at 651 n.42 (citing United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 805 (2d Cir. 
1974)). 
 
25 Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (holding that having a dog sniff a 
bag to detect the presence of illegal narcotics is not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, and noting that such activity is minimally intrusive and does not reveal 
anything other than the presence or absence of contraband). 
 
26 See generally Tobias W. Mock, Comment, The TSA’s New X-Ray Vision: The Fourth 
Amendment Implications of “Body-Scan” Searches at Domestic Airport Security 
Checkpoints, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 213, 218-19 (2009). 
 
27 Justin Florence & Robert Friedman, Profiles in Terror: A Legal Framework for the 
Behavioral Profiling Paradigm, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423, 428 (2010). 
 
28 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE SCREENING OF 
PASSENGERS BY OBSERVATION TECHNIQUES (SPOT) PROGRAM 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_tsa_spot.pdf.  Once an individual 
triggers further investigation, the TSA “may collect,” inter alia, a passenger’s full name, 
permanent addresses, employer information, social security number, date of birth, race, 
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involuntary physical and physiological reactions that may indicate stress, 
fear or deception regardless of race, gender, age, or religion.”29  
Passengers demonstrating certain flagged characteristics are subject to 
secondary screening.30  In 2009, BDOs subjected nearly 100,000 
passengers to further screening.31  The TSA also uses highly trained dogs 
to detect traces of explosive substances in some locations.32 
 
B. Secondary Screening Methods 
 
[10] The TSA conducts secondary screening due to “a compelling need 
for further investigation after an initial magnetometer reading showing 
metal.”33  The methods employed during secondary screening are more 
invasive, with the level of invasiveness corresponding to the degree of 
suspicion aroused by the passenger who failed primary screening.34  
 
                                                
height, and weight as well as photographs of carry-on luggage and identifying 
information of traveling companion.  See id. 
 
29 Id.; see also GEORGE ORWELL 1984 62 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1949) (“It was 
terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you were in any public place or 
within range of a telescreen.  The smallest thing could give you away.  A nervous tic, an 
unconscious look of anxiety, a habit of muttering to yourself – anything that carried with 
it the suggestion of abnormalty, of having something to hide.  In any case, to wear and 
improper expression on your face (to look incredulous when a victory was announced, for 
example) was itself a punishable offense.  There was even a word for it in Newspeak: 
facecrime, it was called.”). 
 
30 Id. 
 
31 See Florence & Friedman, supra note 27, at 427. 
 
32 See TSA’s National Explosives Detection Canine Team, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.tsa.gov/ lawenforcement/programs/editorial_1886.shtm (last visited Nov. 18, 
2010).  Generally, dog sniffs are not Fourth Amendment searches.  E.g., Place, 462 U.S. 
696. 
 
33 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 808 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 
34 See, e.g., United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the 
increased level of invasiveness accompanying subsequent screenings). 
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[11] Upon failing a magnetometer walkthrough, the TSO may give the 
passenger an opportunity to remove any metal objects from his person and 
walk through the magnetometer again.35  This increase in scrutiny is the 
least intrusive “next step” of the screening process.36  The Second Circuit 
has held a second walkthrough or a similar minimally intrusive screening 
is required before a TSO may perform a frisk.37  Similarly, security often 
uses handheld magnetometers to determine the specific location of 
offending metal on a passenger’s person.38  While more invasive than the 
walk-through magnetometer, the intrusion is still substantially less than a 
manual frisk.39  
 
[12] If a passenger fails magnetometer technology screening, TSA 
agents then perform a manual pat-down.40  These searches are highly 
invasive.41  In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court described such frisks as 
“serious intrusion[s] upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict 
great indignity and arouse strong resentment, [which are] not to be 
undertaken lightly.”42  While security often limits its searches to the 
                                                
35 See Albarado, 495 F.2d at 802, 808. 
 
36 See id. 
 
37 See id. at 808 (holding that a frisk of a passenger who failed a magnetometer 
walkthrough was unreasonable because less intrusive measures, such as a second 
walkthrough, were available). 
 
38 See, e.g., id. at 809 (mentioning the use of a handheld magnetometer as a method of 
secondary screening less invasive than a frisk). 
 
39 See generally id. at 803, 807 (explaining that although handheld magnetometer 
searches are short of unobtrusive, there is no physical touching, and the duration is brief 
as compared to a frisk). 
 
40 See, e.g., id. at 807. 
 
41 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1961) (declaring the assertion that a frisk is a 
“petty indignity” is “simply fantastic”). 
 
42 Id. at 17. 
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passenger’s outer clothing, security may also perform a full frisk.43  The 
line between a pat-down and a frisk is not a bright one.44 
 
[13] While not commonplace, strip searches do occur in the airport 
context, and are thus relevant to the full-body scanner discussion.45  “The 
lawfulness of a strip search depends on whether the circumstances 
reasonably justify such an intrusive invasion of privacy.”46  Although the 
intrusiveness of a strip search is tremendous, courts have upheld strip 
searches conducted incident to arrest47 and within the penal context.48  In 
fact, the Supreme Court has held that inmates, by virtue of their status, 
have fewer constitutional protections; therefore, they are subject to more 
invasive searches upon “less than probable cause.”49  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court has upheld searches of schoolchildren conducted on less 
than probable cause when the search furthered legitimate, pedagogical 
concerns.50  The Court predicated such holdings on the proposition that 
schoolchildren do not enjoy the constitutional rights of free adults. 51  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court limited the ability of school officials to 
                                                
43 See Albarado, 495 F.2d at 807. 
 
44 See id. (“[T]he right to pat-down carries with it authorization for a full frisk since 
presumably . . . we are authorizing what is necessary to get the job done.”). 
 
45 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 548-49 (1980). 
 
46 United States v. Cofield, 391 F.3d 334, 336 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). 
 
47 See, e.g., id. at 338. 
 
48 See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 560. 
 
49 Id. 
 
50 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (upholding the 
drug testing of student athletes); New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) 
(upholding the search of a student’s purse for drugs). 
 
51 See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341); T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
at 341. 
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conduct strip searches of students in Safford Unified School District # 1 v. 
Redding.52 
 
IV. FULL-BODY SCANNERS 
  
[14] Full-body scanners have made a splash in media outlets, and their 
presence in United States airports is increasing.53  In the preflight 
screening context, “full-body scan” refers to scans conducted with either 
millimeter wave or backscatter x-ray technology.54  According to the TSA 
website, as of November 18, 2010 “there [were] 385 imaging technology 
units at 68 airports.”55  It is likely that these numbers will grow, as the 
Department of Homeland Security planned to use funds from the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) to purchase and 
then distribute 450 full-body scanners during 2010.56 
 
A. How They Work 
 
[15] Millimeter wave scanners emit radio waves in the millimeter wave 
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.57  Two revolving antennas direct 
                                                
52 See 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009) (“Here, the content of the suspicion failed to match 
the degree of intrusion.”). 
 
53 See, e.g., Cam Simpson & Daniel Michaels, TSA Pressed on Full-Body Scans Despite 
Concerns, WALL ST. J., Jan.  9, 2010, at A2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB126296286103421603.html. 
 
54  See PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 2. 
 
55 AIT, supra note 10. 
 
56 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Office of the Press Sec’y, Secretary 
Napolitano Announces Additional Recovery Act-Funded Advanced Imaging Technology 
Deployments (July 20, 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/ 
releases/pr_1279642622060.shtm (“ARRA, signed into law by President Obama on Feb. 
17, 2009, committed more than $3 billion for homeland security projects through DHS 
and the General Services Administration (GSA).  Of the $1 billion allocated to TSA for 
aviation security projects, $734 million is dedicated to screening checked baggage and 
$266 million is allocated for checkpoint explosives detection technologies.”). 
 
57 Solomon, supra note 23, at 657. 
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the radio waves across the entire surface of an individual’s body.58  Upon 
striking a surface, the waves reflect back to the scanner, and a computer 
constructs a three-dimensional, nude model of the passenger.59  By 
comparing the reflected waves to electromagnetic waves emitting from the 
human body, the millimeter wave machines construct an image that 
contrasts “flesh, metal and plastic.”60  
 
[16] Backscatter x-ray scanners blast the entire surface of the body with 
a “low-intensity x-ray beam.”61  When this beam hits an object, the beam 
bounces off the surface (“scatter”) at differing angles, depending on the 
composition of the surface.62  The backscatter x-ray scanner produces an 
image of a passenger’s entire body surface and, based on the angles of the 
backscatter, indicates the presence of many types of foreign objects.63 
 
B. Privacy Protection Efforts 
 
[17] The TSA has instituted protective measures to reduce violations of 
privacy.64  First, the TSA instituted several spatial protections.  The TSO 
viewing the full-body scan remains isolated from the passenger being 
screened.65  Thus, the TSO viewing the image cannot see the passenger, 
and the TSO assisting the passenger cannot see the image.  Notably, there 
is no guarantee the person viewing the image will be the same gender as 
                                                
58 Id. 
 
59 Id. at 645. 
 
60 Id. at 657. 
 
61 Id. at 653. 
 
62 See id. 
 
63 See Solomon, supra note 23, at 653; cf. Jeffrey W. Childers, Comment, Kyllo v. United 
States: A Temporary Reprieve from Technology-Enhanced Surveillance of the Home, 81 
N.C. L. REV. 728, 766-67 (2003). 
 
64 AIT, supra note 10. 
 
65 PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 2. 
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the person being screened.  Finally, the operation of full-body scanners 
must comply with a standard operating procedure (the details of which are 
not available to the public).66 
 
[18] The TSA also employs technological measures that mitigate the 
vividness of the images.67  The “millimeter wave technology blurs all 
facial features and backscatter technology has an algorithm applied to the 
entire image.”68  Additionally, although full-body scanners have “the 
capability of collecting and storing an image, the image storage functions 
will be disabled by the manufacturer before the devices are placed in an 
airport.”69  As such, “[i]mages will be maintained on the screen only for as 
long as it takes to resolve any anomalies,” and “[t]he image is deleted in 
order to permit the next individual to be screened.”70  Finally, any TSO 
charged with viewing the images “will be prohibited from bringing any 
device into the viewing area that has any photographic capability.”71   
 
C. Privacy Risks 
 
[19] While the TSA heralds full-body scanners as the future of 
antiterrorism efforts, it is necessary to consider the negative effects of 
using such devices.  The American Civil Liberties Union aptly calls this 
technology a “virtual strip-search,”72 because the images, while they do 
                                                
66 Id. at 4-5. 
 
67 See Privacy, supra note 11; PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9. 
 
68 Privacy, supra note 11; see also PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 4. 
 
69 PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 4. 
 
70 Id.  See generally infra Part IV.C (stating a machine does not delete an image 
automatically if the image remains on the screen until there is a determination of the 
source of any suspicious areas). 
 
71 PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 4;  
 
72 ACLU Backgrounder on Body Scanners and “Virtual Strip Searches,” ACLU (Jan. 8, 
2010), http://www.aclu.org/ technology-and-liberty/aclu-backgrounder-body-scanners-
and-%E2%80%9Cvirtual-strip-searches%E2%80%9D; ACLU Urges Senate to Examine 
TSA’s Privacy Violations in Post-9/11 Record, ACLU (Oct. 16, 2010), 
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not display typical photographic quality, betray intimate details of 
passengers’ bodies.73  It is unquestionable that a serious intrusion occurs 
when the government takes intimate images of citizens, blurring 
algorithms notwithstanding.74  Thus, each image constitutes a fundamental 
intrusion of passenger privacy, a conclusion drawing support from the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Redding, which indicated that simply 
ensuring the TSOs “will not see everything” does not align full-body scans 
with the Fourth Amendment.75   
 
[20] There are a growing number of troubling accounts of adverse 
encounters with full-body scanners.76  In addition to body parts, full-body 
                                                
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-urges-senate-examine-tsa%E2%80%99s-
privacy-violations-post-911-record; see also Mock, supra note 26, at 229. 
73 See, e.g., Backscatter X-Ray Scan Sample, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,  
http://www.tsa.gov/graphics/images/approach/ backscatter_large.jpg (last visited Nov. 
18, 2010); Millimeter Wave Scan Sample, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.tsa.gov/graphics/images/approach/mmw_large.jpg (last visited Nov. 18, 
2010). 
 
74 See generally Mock, supra note 26, at 230.  Algorithms that blur faces and other 
intimate details arguably mitigate the degree of intrusiveness, but they do not preclude an 
intrusion. 
 
75 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (holding that a 
search requiring the exposure of a student’s breast and pelvic regions is categorically 
distinct and requires justification by school authorities for going beyond a search of the 
student’s belongings and outer clothing). 
 
76 See, e.g., Leonora LaPeter Anton, Scan of Girl, 12, Upsets Parents, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, July 18, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/transportation/ 
airport-body-scanners-reveal-all-but-what-about-when-its-your-kid/1109659 (discussing 
a whole-body scan performed on a twelve year-old girl without parental consent); David 
Ovalle, Miami Airport Screener Accused of Attack After Jeers at Genitals, MIAMI 
HERALD, May 7, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/05/06/1617423/miami-
airport-screener-beats-co.html (discussing the arrest of a TSA screener who attacked a 
co-worker who observed the screener’s private body parts during a training session and 
began telling daily jokes about them); Gary Stoller, Backlash Grows Vs. Full-Body 
Scanners, Fliers Worry About Privacy, Health Risks, USA TODAY, July 13, 2010, at A1, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/travel/2010-07-13-1Abodyscans 
13_ST_N.htm (providing one frequent traveler’s lamentations on the length of the 
procedure). 
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imaging machines display various medical apparatuses, such as catheters 
and prosthetics.77  This leads to invasive follow-up screening to confirm 
the innocuous nature of prosthetics and other medical devices.78  
 
[21] The potential retention of full-body scan images also threatens 
passenger privacy.  Although TSOs “will be prohibited from bringing any 
device into the viewing area that has any photographic capability,”79 the 
TSA cannot guarantee this rule will remain inviolate.  Perhaps the most 
troubling aspect, the scanned images remain on the screen until 
affirmatively deleted.80  Despite the TSA’s claims of “automatic” 
deletion,81 the screening agent must take some affirmative act to erase an 
image.82  “Automatic” implies the deletion occurs without any human 
intervention, but a more thorough review of the process reveals that 
deletion is not actually automatic.83  The retention of images on the screen 
until affirmatively deleted widens the conduit for potential abuse. 
 
                                                
77 Statement of Timothy D. Sparapani, ACLU Legislative Counsel, at a Hearing 
Regarding the U.S. Transportation Security Administration’s Physical Screening of 
Airline Passengers and Related Cargo Screening Before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/cpredirect/24856 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
 
78 See id. (“Even the presence of a seemingly innocuously shaped item, such as a 
prosthetic device or implant, will require subsequent (and potentially humiliating) 
verification.  Thus, X-ray backscatter requires a tremendous invasion of privacy with 
little speed or efficiency gains.”). 
 
79 PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 4. 
 
80 See id. 
 
81 See Privacy, supra note 11 (“[Each] image is automatically deleted from the system 
after it is cleared by the remotely located security officer.”). 
 
82 See PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF WBI, supra note 9, at 4.  Even if the manufacturer of the 
machine disables its storage capability, such action is vitally short of automatic deletion. 
See id. 
 
83 See id. (“[An] image will remain on the screen until the item is cleared either by the 
TSO recognizing the item on the screen, or by a physical screening by the TSO with the 
individual.”). 
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[22] Regardless of the deletion mechanism, retention of images is not 
the ultimate privacy violation.  What happens to the images after they are 
taken is merely symptomatic of the actual intrusion: the scan producing 
the images.  If a police officer took photographs of a home while 
conducting an illegal search, destruction of the photographs would not 
cure the constitutional violation.84  The photographs, like the full-body 
scan images, are fruits of the violation, not the actual violation.85  Thus, 
the TSA’s disingenuous assertions regarding the fate of the images are 
relevant to the degree of injury,86 which comes into play only after the 
violation of a passengers’ person.87  
 
[23] The procedure whereby a TSO views the images from a remote 
location exacerbates the privacy violation.88  In United States v. Skipwith, 
the Fifth Circuit identified three factors that mitigate the intrusiveness of 
pat-downs in the context of secondary searches.89  The court reasoned that 
“[u]nlike searches . . . where often the office and the subject are the only 
witnesses, these [pat-downs] are made under supervision and not far from 
the scrutiny of the traveling public.”90 In a sense, full-body imaging 
systems foreclose a passenger’s ability to confront his or her accuser.91  
                                                
84 Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362 (1998) (citing U.S. v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 906 (1984)). 
 
85 See Scott, 524 U.S. at 362-63. 
 
86 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)) (identifying the degree of an intrusion as a factor to 
consider in determining the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 
87 See Mock, supra note 26, at 238 (“[T]he technology produces extremely detailed 
images that expose intimate parts of the body and invade basic privacy expectations.”). 
 
88 See Privacy, supra note 11 (“[T]he officer who assists the passenger never sees the 
image the technology produces.  The officer who views the image is remotely located in a 
secure resolution room and never sees the passenger.”). 
 
89 See 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 
90 Id. at 1276.  
 
91 See Privacy, supra note 11 (stating the officer and screened passenger never see each 
other). 
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While it is clear that the degree of intrusiveness is great, the question 
remains whether the technological intermediary between passenger and 
screener actually mitigates the invasiveness.92  Functionally, full-body 
scans are comparable to a system where a passenger physically disrobes, 
dons a mask, and stands before a camera while a remotely located TSO 
inspects the passenger via a grainy video feed.93  The chief difference is 
that with a full-body scan, the TSA saves the passenger the inconvenience 
of physically disrobing.  The same fundamental intrusion occurs in either 
case: the government peeks under passengers’ clothes. 
 
[24] The potential surreptitious interception of images presents an 
additional concern.  The remoteness of the TSO viewing the full-body 
images requires transmission of the images from the receptors on the 
scanner to where the images are processed and displayed.94  Although the 
exact process of transmission remains unclear, the interception of images 
along this path is quite possible.  
 
[25] Although the TSA claims full-body scanning devices further the 
goals of safety while minimizing intrusiveness, the technology has 
weaknesses.95  Any discussion of reasonable uses for full-body scanners 
must consider the efficacy of the scanners.  How much safety is attained 
through the sacrifice of liberty to full-body scanners?  It seems reasonable 
                                                
 
92 See Robyn E. Blumner, Government, Don’t Dare Scan My Body, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at 5P, available at http://www.tampabay.com/ 
opinion/columns/article858283.ece (“Do we really have to show the TSA - some man in 
a windowless booth - what we otherwise reserve for our spouses and personal physicians 
in order to fly?”); supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 
93 Either way the passenger is little more than a “disrobed faceless form[] of no position.”  
See generally BOB DYLAN, CHIMES OF FREEDOM (Columbia Records 1964), reprinted in 
JENNY LEDEEN, PROPHECY IN THE CHRISTIAN ERA 179 (1995). 
 
94 See Privacy, supra note 11. 
 
95 See generally Letter from Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. et al. to Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., and Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/ 
backscatter/petition_042110.pdf [hereinafter, EPIC Petition]. 
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to infer that terrorists who intend to highjack a plane will diligently seek 
ways to circumvent full-body scanners.96  One glaring deficiency is the 
scanners’ potential inability to detect pentaerythritol tetranitrate, the 
powdery explosive used in the unsuccessful bombing attempt of a 
Northwest Airlines flight on December 25, 2009, remains a glaring 
deficiency.97  Because the images show only the epidermis, subdermal 
objects escape detection.98  A British intelligence agency even intercepted 
information indicating that female terrorists might use explosive breast 
implants to bring down planes.99  Furthermore, full-body scans do not 
discover any objects in the alimentary canal.100  Of course, quantifying the 
efficacy of any deterrent proves difficult when every non-terrorist who 
flies commercially is a potential false positive.101  
 
[26] The Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) waged a war 
against the Department of Homeland Security to prevent the proliferation 
of full-body scanners.102  EPIC filed two lawsuits for injunctive relief and 
to obtain documentation related to full-body scanners under the Freedom 
                                                
96 See Hanson, supra note 17, at 172. 
 
97 EPIC Petition, supra note 95, at 5-6. 
 
98 In other words, objects surgically inserted beneath the skin could evade full-body 
scans. See Heidi Blake, Terrorists ‘Could Use Exploding Breast Implants to Blow Up 
Jet’, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 24, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ 
terrorism-in-the-uk/7510350/Terrorists-could-use-exploding-breast-implants-to-blow-up-
jet.html. 
 
99 Blake, supra note 98. 
 
100 See ACLU Backgrounder, supra note 72. 
 
101 Any assertion that a particular measure “deters” hijacking attempts is nothing more 
than a hypothesis.  One can neither prove nor disprove such hypothesis; they can only 
support or refute it with evidence. 
 
102 See generally EPIC v. Department of Homeland Security - Body Scanners, ELEC. 
PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/epic_v_dhs.html (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
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of Information Act.103  Additionally, EPIC petitioned the Department of 
Homeland Security to suspend the use of full-body scanners at domestic 
airports.104  The petition garnered the support of thirty groups, the diversity 
of which demonstrates the breadth of opposition to full-body scanners.105  
  
D.  Health Risks 
 
[27] In addition to threatening passenger privacy rights, the full-body 
imaging machines potentially pose health risks to passengers.106  After 
conducting a series of tests, the TSA concluded that “the radiation doses 
for the individuals being screened, operators, and bystanders were well 
below the dose limits specified by the American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI).”107  The TSA compared the energy doses to doses 
received from other sources: “For comparison, the energy projected by 
millimeter wave technology is thousands of times less than a cell phone 
transmission.  A single scan using backscatter technology produces 
exposure equivalent to two minutes of flying on an airplane.”108   
 
[28] Yet members of the medical profession and a few pilot unions 
have expressed concern regarding the amount of radiation emitting from 
                                                
103 See generally Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 109 Civ. 02084, 2009 WL 3874014 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2009); 
Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
No. 1:10 Civ. 00063, 2010 WL 171520 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2010). 
 
104 See generally EPIC Petition, supra note 95. 
 
105 See id. at 9 (including, among others, the American Civil Liberties Union, Asian 
American Legal Education and Defense Fund, Campaign for Liberty, Consumer 
Federation of America, Council on American Islamic Relations, Muslim Legal Fund of 
America, National Center for Transgender Equality, Republican Liberty Caucus, and the 
Rutherford Institute). 
 
106 Cf. Safety, Advanced Imaging Technology, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN. 
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/safety.shtm (last visited Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter 
Safety]. 
 
107 Id. 
 
108 Id. 
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these scanners.109  In a letter to John P. Holdren, President Obama’s 
Director and Advisor of Science and Technology, four professors from the 
University of California, San Francisco, noted, “The majority of [the 
backscattering scanners’] energy is delivered to the skin and the 
underlying tissue [and] while the dose would be safe if it were distributed 
throughout the volume of the entire body, the dose to the skin may be 
dangerously high.”110  The professors also acknowledged “that real 
independent safety data do not exist,” and outlined several concerns 
including: the high risk for the immunocompromised, such as individuals 
with cancer or HIV; the lack of research on radiation exposure for children 
and the elderly, who are more susceptible to health complications; the 
risks to pregnant woman and to the fetus; and the risks of mutagenesis of 
testicular and breast tissue.111  Despite these concerns, the TSA remains 
confident in the safety of full-body scanners.112 
 
V. REASONABLENESS STANDARDS 
  
[29] In government search or seizure challenges, the threshold inquiry 
asks whether the government activity amounted to a search or seizure 
                                                
109  See Letter from John Sedat, Professor Emeritus in Biochemistry and Biophysics, 
University of California, San Francisco et al. to John P. Holdren, Assistant to the 
President for Science and Technology, Director of the White House Office of Science 
and Technology Policy, and Co-Chair of the President's Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology (Apr. 6, 2010) available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
35498347/UCSF-letter-to-Holdren-concerning-health-risks-of-full-body-scanner-TSA-
screenings-4-6-2010; Mark Forgione, TSA Body Scanners Still Raising Concerns? Here’s 
Why, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, available at http://www.latimes.com/health/ 
boostershots/la-heb-airport-scanners-20101118,0,7359745.story (discussing requests 
from pilot unions that pilots be exempt from screening because repeat exposure to the 
devices’ radiation may cause health risks); see also Nicole Brochu, Airport Body 
Scanners May Pose Cancer Risk, Scientists Say, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/health/fl-nbcol-body-scanner-cancer-brochu120101117,0,30262 
03.column (discussing recent concern doctors has expressed regarding exposure to 
radiation from the full-body scanners). 
 
110 Letter from John Sedat, supra note 109. 
 
111 Id. 
 
112 See Safety, supra note 106. 
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under the Fourth Amendment.113  Government conduct that does not 
amount to a search or seizure does not trigger Fourth Amendment 
protections.114  However, if government conduct is a search or seizure, the 
inquiry turns on whether the search or seizure was reasonable.115  Courts 
consider preflight screenings searches under the Fourth Amendment, and 
generally hold them to be reasonable even when initiated without 
suspicion.116  Given the significant threat millimeter wave and backscatter 
x-ray scanners pose to passenger privacy, courts must determine when the 
use of such technology is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
 
[30] Unfortunately, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has not produced 
a definitive test for reasonableness.117  As Thomas K. Clancy noted, the 
different tests applied by the Supreme Court form a collage of overlapping 
and, at times, inconsistent standards for determining reasonableness.118  
                                                
113 See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294 (1973) (finding the detention of an individual 
constituted a seizure of his person before noting the implication of the Fourth 
Amendment); see also THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY 
AND INTERPRETATION 3 (2008). 
 
114 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (finding that a police officer action 
did not constitute a search and, therefore, did not implicate the Fourth Amendment); see 
also CLANCY, supra note 113, at 3-4. 
 
115 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (noting that the Fourth 
Amendment only prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures); see also CLANCY, 
supra note 113, at 3-4. 
 
116 See, e.g., United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972) (“We agree that 
the use of the magnetometer in these circumstances was a ‘search’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.  By this device a government officer, without permission, 
discerned metal on Epperson's person.  That he did so electronically rather than by 
patting down his outer clothing or ‘frisking’ may make the search more tolerable and less 
offensive-but it is still a search.”); see also United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803-
04 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that such searches seem reasonable given their necessity and 
public acceptance); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(applying reasonableness standard); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182-83 (3d 
Cir. 1972) (“Reasonableness is the ultimate standard.”). 
 
117 See CLANCY, supra note 113, at 468. 
 
118 See generally id. at 470-509. 
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The unparalleled intrusiveness of full-body scans and lack of Supreme 
Court guidance necessitate a deconstruction of preflight screening 
jurisprudence and application of a reasonableness standard responsive to 
the need to thwart terrorist hijackings while securing passenger privacy 
rights. Accordingly, this section, employing Thomas K. Clancy’s survey 
of the law in The Fourth Amendment: Its History and Interpretation as a 
model,119 makes a broad sweep across Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
discussing the various standards for reasonableness and assessing the 
appropriateness of those standards for preflight screening.  
 
A. Warrant Requirement 
  
[31] The Supreme Court based many of its early Fourth Amendment 
decisions on an interpretation that the probable cause requirement in the 
Warrant Clause defines “unreasonable” in the Reasonableness Clause.120  
The Warrant Clause states “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”121  For some 
time, the Court indicated that all searches must comply with the Warrant 
Clause (i.e. must be pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause) to 
comport with the Fourth Amendment.122  But while warrants are preferable 
for general crime fighting searches, they are impractical in other 
circumstances.123  
 
[32] The Court has identified exceptions to the warrant requirement for 
situations in which the requirement would unduly hamper law 
                                                
119 Id. 
 
120 See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6, (1932); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 393 (1914); see also CLANCY, supra note 113, at 471. 
 
121 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 
122 See, e.g.,Taylor, 286 U.S. at 6; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 29 (1925); 
Weeks, 232 U.S. 3at 393; see also CLANCY, supra note 113, at 471. 
 
123 See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s general preference for searches executed under the authority of a 
warrant). 
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enforcement:124 (1) when officers or citizens face imminent danger;125 (2) 
when there is risk of flight;126 and (3) when there is potential that 
incriminating evidence will be lost or destroyed.127  But, “[o]nly in those 
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for 
that of the Framers.”128  Thus, “warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically delineated and well-
recognized exceptions.”129 
 
B. Special Needs Doctrine 
 
[33] Special needs searches are analytically distinct from standard 
Fourth Amendment searches.  The special needs doctrine provides an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment “‘when special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 
requirement impracticable.’”130  Nevertheless, “[t]o pass constitutional 
muster, an administrative search must meet the Fourth Amendment's 
standard of reasonableness.”131  Although the Court has yet to rule directly 
on the constitutionality of preflight searches,132 it has upheld other 
                                                
124 See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 760 (1984) (White, J., dissenting). 
 
125 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 
126 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967). 
 
127 See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963). 
 
128 New Jersey v.T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 
129 Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
130 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)); see also CLANCY, supra note 113, at 501. 
 
131 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 
132 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 959 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (stating that 
the Supreme Court has thrice suggested that administrative preflight searches are 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 
32, 47-48 (2000); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“where the risk to public 
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suspicionless searches “[under] limited circumstances in which the usual 
rule does not apply.”133   
 
[34] In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court 
upheld suspicionless drug testing of armed government employees, 
specifically drug interdiction officers.134  The Court noted that a 
reasonable governmental search does not always necessitate a warrant, 
probable cause, or “individualized suspicion.”135  Searches without such 
elements prove reasonable when “the Government's need to discover such 
latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently 
compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such 
searches without any measure of individualized suspicion.”136  
Considering the likelihood of armed officers confronting dangerous and 
volatile situations, the Court noted “the Government's need to conduct the 
suspicionless searches . . . outweighs the privacy interests of employees 
engaged directly in drug interdiction.”137   
 
[35] Courts have extended the special needs doctrine to include public 
school searches.138  In Vernonia School District v. Acton, the Court found 
that drug tests conducted on student athletes demonstrated a special need, 
preempting requirements of individualized suspicion.139  Additionally, 
                                                
safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may 
rank as ‘reasonale’”); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 
(1989). 
 
133 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. 
 
134 See 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989). 
 
135 See id. at 665 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618-24 
(1989)). 
 
136 Id. at 668 (emphasis added). 
 
137 Id. 
 
138 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). 
 
139 See id. at 664-65 (upholding the drug-testing of student-athletes after considering the 
nature of the privacy interest at issue, the character of the intrusion, the governmental 
interest, and the efficacy of the search in promoting the interest). 
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some courts have extended the doctrine to exempt preflight screening from 
Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements.140  In United 
States v. Moreno, the Fifth Circuit noted that airline hijackers often raise 
suspicion only after the opportunity passes for law enforcement to prevent 
harm.141  Noting the difficulties in detecting perpetrators and the chaotic 
nature of airport security checkpoints, the court upheld the reasonableness 
of suspicionless preflight screening.142 
 
[36] Administrative searches are a subcategory of special needs 
searches.143  They serve “as part of a general regulatory scheme in 
furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying 
of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent 
hijackings.”144  In Chandler v. Miller, the Supreme Court stated in dicta 
“that where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket 
suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’-for 
example, searches now routine at airports.”145   
 
[37] Notably, officials do not conduct administrative searches for 
generalized crime fighting, but in the course of overseeing some regulated 
activity such as code-enforcement searches of apartment complexes.146  In 
                                                
140 See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 
141 See id. (finding the particular dangers of airline hijackings give rise to exigent 
circumstances allowing for reasonable search without individualized suspicion). 
 
142 Id. at 49-50.  Interestingly, this decision conflicts with the premise underpinning the 
TSA’s behavior detection program.  The TSA program is based on the rationale that 
BDOs can sniff out would-be hijackers.  See PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 
28, at 2.  The Fifth Circuit asserts that suspicionless preflight searches are reasonable 
because would-be hijackers provide almost no naturally perceptible indication of their 
intentions.  Moreno, 475 F.2d at 49-50.   
 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973), abrogated by 
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 
144 Id. 
 
145 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (emphasis added).  Note, again, the language employed by 
the Court is responsive to the relative intrusiveness of the search. 
 
146 See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967). 
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New York v. Burger, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute 
authorizing warrantless searches of a junkyard because the business was 
heavily regulated and the searches were in furtherance of the 
administrative scheme.147  This application was used in United States v. 
Edwards, in which the Second Circuit noted that suspicionless preflight 
searches do not fit into previously recognized warrant exceptions, but are 
more closely analogized to administrative searches.148  Similarly, in United 
States v. Aukai, the Ninth Circuit upheld a preflight magnetometer search 
as a reasonable administrative search despite a lack of individualized 
suspicion.149  While the administrative search doctrine justifies some 
preflight searches, it does not provide a license to conduct all searches.  
The invasiveness of full-body scans is far greater than typical 
administrative searches.  Therefore, the administrative searches doctrine is 
not an appropriate tool to measure the reasonableness of full-body scans. 
  
C. Balancing 
 
[38] Courts also apply a balancing test to make reasonableness 
determinations.150  The test consists of “‘balancing [a search’s] intrusion 
on [an] individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of 
legitimate government interests.’”151  This balancing approach supplies a 
framework for analysis that ad hoc reasonableness does not, but the way 
courts loads the scales results in the erosion of Fourth Amendment 
protections.152  When assessing situations where a search goes beyond 
                                                
147 See 482 U.S. 691, 715-16 (1987).   
 
148 See 498 F.2d 496, 498, 498 n.5 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 
149 See 497 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).  The court relied on the Supreme 
Court’s rationale in New York v. Berger to reach the conclusion that the search was 
reasonable.  Id. at 959.  
 
150 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); CLANCY, supra note 
113, at 489. 
 
151 E.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004) (quoting Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
 
152 CLANCY, supra note 113, at 490-91; see Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.  It is worth noting that 
the Court expressly limited its holding to finding that the initial intrusion (the initial stop 
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normal crime fighting (such as preflight searches), the Supreme Court 
loads the government’s side of the scale with the weight of all harm the 
governmental regulation seeks to prevent.153  The individual who 
challenges a search stands alone on the other side of the scale.154  This 
inequitable balancing scheme is glaring in the case of Michigan State 
Department of Police v. Sitz,155 where the Court weighed the entire 
nationwide problem of drunken driving against Sitz’s personal interest.156  
Unsurprisingly, the Court held the balance tipped in favor of the 
government.157 
 
[39] A further problem with the balancing approach occurs when judges 
place a “thumb on the scale” in favor of the government.158  As Guido 
Calabresi argues, this advanced credit is even more dangerous than it 
initially appears because such a decision sets a precedent, which 
recalibrates the scale in favor of the government.159  Thus, when courts 
apply precedent in a subsequent case, they apply it along with another 
judicial thumb on the scale, further recalibrating the scale in favor of the 
                                                
of the vehicle) was reasonable.  See id. at 450-51.  Thus, the Court only applied the 
balancing test to determine the reasonableness of the initial intrusion, not to determine 
whether the treatment beyond the initial intrusion was reasonable.  See id. 
 
153 See CLANCY, supra note 113, at 498 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451, which balanced the 
damage caused by intoxicated drivers nationwide against the interest of a single driver). 
 
154 See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (1990). 
 
155 See id.; CLANCY, supra note 113, at 497. 
 
156 See id. 
 
157 See id. at 455. 
 
158 Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 112 
(2003); see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (citing New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)) (“Courts attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth 
Amendment balance thus credit the government's side with an essential interest in readily 
administrable rules.”). 
 
159 Calabresi, supra note 158 at 112. 
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government.160  This process results in a serial erosion of Fourth 
Amendment protections. 
 
[40] Sitz foreshadows the dangers of using the balancing test in the 
preflight screening context.161  The government has a tremendous interest 
in preventing terrorist attacks, which arguably is a greater interest than the 
prevention of drunken driving.  Even though a compulsory full-body scan 
greatly intrudes upon individual privacy, it would not likely outweigh the 
government’s interest in preventing terrorist hijackings.  In fact, it is hard 
to imagine an individual interest greater than the national (perhaps global) 
interest in preventing terrorism.162  Thus, individuals would lose 
significant Fourth Amendment protection if courts apply the Sitz balancing 
test in cases involving the preflight screening process. 
 
D. Ad Hoc Reasonableness 
 
[41] Courts sometimes make ad hoc determinations of reasonableness 
by weighing the peculiar facts and circumstances of each individual 
case.163  Like the warrant preference,164 this approach looks to the text of 
the amendment and, finding reasonableness to be the only criterion, 
determines whether a particular search is “reasonable” under the totality of 
the circumstances.165  In United States v. Aukai, the Ninth Circuit adopted 
this approach, holding a preflight search reasonable because it was “‘no 
more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of 
                                                
160 Id. 
 
161 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“By holding that no level of 
suspicion is necessary before the police may stop a car for the purpose of preventing 
drunken driving, the Court potentially subjects the general public to arbitrary or harassing 
conduct by the police.”). 
 
162 Cf. id. at 451 (“No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving 
problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it.). 
 
163 See CLANCY, supra note 113, at 485. 
 
164 See generally id. at 486-89. 
 
165 See generally id. 
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currenttechnology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives [ 
][and] that it [was] confined in good faith to that purpose.’”166  
Furthermore, some courts purport to consider preflight searches 
reasonable under the doctrine of administrative searches, but in fact 
conduct an ad hoc reasonableness determination.167   
 
[42] The primary deficiency of ad hoc reasonableness determinations is 
that the ambiguous term “reasonable” offers the sole source of guidance.168  
As such, a court may uphold a search as reasonable where a person poses 
no suspicion of a threat to safety.  Additionally, a court may uphold a 
search as reasonable under an ad hoc reasonableness standard despite the 
availability of less intrusive alternatives.169  But, as the Court stated in 
Davis v. Mississippi, “[i]nvestigatory seizures would subject unlimited 
numbers of innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to 
involuntary detention [and n]othing is more clear than that the Fourth 
Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal 
security of our citizenry.”170  The emerging technologies of full-body 
scanners create “wholesale intrusions” of passenger privacy and as such, 
pose serious threats to Fourth Amendment protections.171  Thus, the 
practice of making ad hoc determinations of reasonableness fails to limit 
sufficiently the application of those technologies. 
 
 
 
                                                
166 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (first and second alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 
167 See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974).  In 
Albarado, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit, in Davis, considered preflight screening 
an administrative search but stated there was “no analytical significance” to that 
categorization.  See id. 
 
168 See CLANCY, supra note 113, at 485-86. 
 
169 See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1983). 
 
170 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969). 
 
171 See id. 
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E. Consent 
 
[43] When a person consents to a search, courts do not require probable 
cause.172  However, an individual must give consent “voluntarily . . . and 
not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.”173  The Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits have held that “consent to the screening process is . . . 
implied and irrevocable,”174 in the context of preflight searches because a 
passenger “has every opportunity to avoid the procedure by not entering 
the boarding area.”175  Conversely, in United States v. Albarado, the 
Second Circuit held that providing a choice of flying or enjoying Fourth 
Amendment protection coerces away from passengers constitutional 
rights, noting that opting to exercise one’s Fourth Amendment rights in 
lieu of flying could subject one to “considerable hardship.”176  The court 
dismissed the notion the government could announce its intention to 
deprive citizens of Fourth Amendment protection in a widely used 
medium of travel and then claim citizens using that medium consented to 
have their rights violated.177  The Second Circuit decided Albarado in 
1974, and since then the argument that air travel is a modern necessity has 
grown more compelling.178   
                                                
172 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). 
 
173 Id. 
 
174 See Mock, supra note 26, at 233 (citing United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 776 
(11th Cir. 1984) (dealing only with the minimally intrusive magnetometer searches); 
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
 
175 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276. 
 
176 See 495 F.2d at 806-07; see also United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 
1973) (stating that choosing other means of interstate and international travel would place 
incalculable burdens on businesses). 
 
177 See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 n.14 (2d Cir. 1974) (comparing the 
argument that purchasing a plane ticket is impliciti consent to a search with a 
hypothetical situation where choosing to use the telephone impliedly consents to a 
wiretap and arguing that this would constitute a deprivation of “a necessity of modern 
living”). 
 
 178 See United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(“Commercial air travel, once a luxury, has become a staple of modern existence.”). 
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[44] Reviewing Albarado in light of the growing use of full-body 
scanners for preflight screening highlights the dangers of diminished 
expectations of privacy.179  As full-body technologies become more 
commonplace, their presence becomes less jarring, and tendency to 
acquiesce to the intrusion increases.  The Supreme Court has recognized a 
right to interstate travel,180 but suspicionless preflight, full-body scans 
erode that right.  Here again, if the government has authority to subject 
passengers to full-body scans for attempting to board an aircraft, the 
Fourth Amendment has little meaning in airports.   
 
F. Individualized Suspicion 
 
[45] “A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”181  
 
[F]ull-scale searches – whether conducted in accordance 
with the warrant requirement or pursuant to one of its 
exceptions – are “reasonable” in Fourth Amendment terms 
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that a crime 
has been committed and that evidence of the crime will be 
found in the place to be searched.182   
 
[46] In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme Court noted there 
are “only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply.”183  
The level of suspicion required for a search to be reasonable under an 
individualized suspicion analysis depends on the nature and duration of 
                                                
179 See generally Albarado, 495 F.2d 799. 
 
180 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941) (striking down a California law 
that prohibited bringing indigent persons into the state because the law placed an undue 
burden on interstate travel). 
 
181 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (citing Chandler v. Miller, 
520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997)). 
 
182 New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 354-55 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
 
183 531 U.S. at 37. 
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the intrusion.184  Courts uphold searches incident to lawful, custodial 
arrests based on probable cause,185 and require articulated, reasonable 
suspicion (a lesser degree of suspicion than probable cause) for a stop and 
frisk.186   This distinction determines not only when a search may take 
place, but limits the scope of a stop and frisk search to dispelling the 
notion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.187 
 
[47] “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within 
[an officer’s] knowledge and of which [the officer] had reasonably 
trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being 
committed.”188  For these reasons, probable cause “does not set the 
constitutional floor” for determining whether a search is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.189 
   
[48] As mentioned above, although requiring probable cause is not 
practicable for primary screening, requiring probable cause before 
subjecting passengers to involuntary secondary full-body scanner 
screenings does not hinder the efficient administration of anti-terrorism 
measures.190  The fact that probable cause does not set an absolute floor 
does not mean it cannot be a floor in some circumstances.  Requiring 
                                                
184 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Albarado, 495 F.2d at 804-05; see also 
CLANCY, supra note 114, at 475. 
 
185 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223-25 (1973). 
 
186 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“[I]n determining whether the officer acted 
reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he 
is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”). 
 
187 See id. at 10. 
 
188 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
 
189 Mock, supra note 26, at 231. 
 
190 Cf. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 49-50 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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probable cause before mandatory full-body screenings is entirely practical 
if the TSA relegates such methods to secondary screening. 
 
[49] “[C]ategories of intrusions that are substantially less intrusive than 
full-scale searches or seizures may be justifiable in accordance with a 
balancing test even absent a warrant or probable cause, provided that the 
balancing test used gives sufficient weight to the privacy interests that will 
be infringed.”191  In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court required a lesser 
degree of suspicion for a stop and frisk.192  Essentially, the Court 
determined the level of Fourth Amendment protection afforded to an 
individual hinges upon the level of suspicion the person arouses.193  Terry 
also provided limits to the scope of a stop and frisk, holding that a “Terry 
stop” amounts to a mini-search, allowing an officer to conduct a stop and 
frisk when he has a reasonable suspicion a crime is afoot and the suspect is 
armed.194  
 
[50] In United States v. Epperson, the Fourth Circuit expressly applied 
the Terry rationale in determining that preflight magnetometer searches 
comport with the Fourth Amendment given their limited scope and 
purpose.195  The court noted the needs prompting the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Terry were analogous to those at airports: the need to perform 
moderately invasive searches to dispel the notion that a person poses a 
danger.196  Similarly, in United States v. Bell, the Second Circuit held a 
                                                
191 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 355 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 
192 See 392 U.S. at 30. 
 
193 See id. 
 
194 See id. at 30-31.  Thus, the Court merely required reasonable suspicion rather than a 
warrant supported by probable cause.  See id. 
 
195 See 454 F.2d 769, 770-72 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding the scope and purpose of preflight 
magnetometer searches exempt such searches from the warrant requirement). 
 
196 See id. at 771. 
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suspicionless magnetometer search reasonable and less intrusive than a 
Terry stop and frisk.197 
 
VI. FULL-BODY SCANS ARE UNREASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT ABSENT PROBABLE CAUSE 
 
[51] “[T]he ultimate strength of our constitutional guarantees lies in 
their unhesitating application in times of crisis and tranquility alike.”198  
Accordingly, the danger of terrorist attacks alone provides insufficient 
justification under the Fourth Amendment for the wholesale application of 
full-body scanners.  All methods of screening used by the TSA must strike 
a difficult balance of thwarting and deterring hijackings without violating 
the Fourth Amendment.  In other words, if the TSA continues to advance 
the full-body scanners as a method of screening, it must be do so in a 
reasonable manner under the Fourth Amendment.  
 
[52] Making reasonableness determinations either on an ad hoc basis or 
by applying a Sitz-like balancing test effectively exempts the TSA from 
Fourth Amendment requirements.199  Similar to other types of searches, 
“an administrative screening search must be as limited in its intrusiveness 
as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies 
it.”200  Although full-body scanners make entering the sterile areas of 
airports with contraband more difficult, they pose grave danger to 
individual privacy.  A prudent weighing of such factors is necessary to 
determine what constitutes reasonable use of full-body scanners.  In light 
of these considerations, the TSA should not use full-body scanners unless 
a TSO has individualized suspicion that a passenger is carrying contraband 
that poses a threat to air security.201 
                                                
197 See 464 F.2d 667, 672-73 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 
198 Id. at 676 (Mansfield, J., concurring). 
 
199 See supra Parts V.C-D. 
 
200 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973), abrogated by United States 
v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc); see supra Part V.B. 
 
201 See United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Airport security 
measures are reasonable . . . insofar as they permit government agents to determine 
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[53] The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Epperson provides an appropriate 
starting point for analyzing what role, if any, full-body scanners should 
play in counterterrorism efforts.202  Notwithstanding the Epperson court’s 
approval of suspicionless magnetometer searches, the court recognized 
that the reasonableness of a governmental search depends upon the degree 
of intrusiveness of the governmental action.203  Therefore, just as a frisk of 
a person on the street requires a greater degree of individualized suspicion 
(reasonable suspicion)204 than a less intrusive magnetometer search on an 
airline ticketholder (no suspicion),205 a highly invasive full-body scan on 
an airline passenger must require an even greater degree of individualized 
suspicion.  Considering the intrusiveness of full-body scans, courts should 
require probable cause as the level of individualized suspicion. 
 
[54] Although requiring probable cause to conduct a full-body scan 
forecloses the use of full-body scanners for suspicionless primary 
screening, it neither unduly hinders the TSA’s counterterrorism efforts nor 
prevents the use of full-body devices.  While an absolute definition of 
probable cause is elusive,206 the theory underpinning the various 
definitions “is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.”207  Thus, the TSA 
                                                
whether a suspect presents an immediate danger to air commerce.”).  Like a Terry stop, 
the justification for the intrusion is danger, and the TSO may not extend the search 
beyond what is necessary to ensure safety.  See id.  Preflight screening has demonstrated 
an uncanny propensity for discovering illegal narcotics.  See generally Aukai, 497 F.3d at 
958; United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d at 499; United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 
1272, 1274 (5th Cir. 1973); Cyzewski, 484 F.2d at 510; Bell, 464 F.2d at 669; United 
States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1181 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 
202 See United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 
203 See id. 
 
204 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
 
205 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
 
206 See CLANCY, supra note 113, at 475-76 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 
695 (1996) (“Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ 
mean is not possible.”). 
 
207 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 
99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)). 
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may subject a person attempting to board an aircraft to a full-body scan 
“where ‘the facts and circumstances within [a TSO’s] knowledge and of 
which [the TSO] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient 
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an 
offense has been or is being committed.”208  Furthermore, depending on 
the particular circumstances, a passenger required to undergo primary 
screening209 might, in the course of such screening, produce sufficient 
evidence to “warrant . . . the belief that an offense has been or is being 
committed.”210 
 
[55] Additionally, to comply with the Fourth Amendment, courts 
should require TSOs to exhaust less intrusive screening methods before 
resorting to a full-body scan.211  While no clear judicial mandate exists 
requiring that TSOs exhaust less intrusive means, courts consistently 
include the non-intrusiveness of magnetometers as a factor in determining 
the reasonable use of such devices for preflight searches.212  Reciprocally, 
the highly intrusive nature of full-body scans should render them 
unreasonable when conducted without individualized suspicion or before 
exhausting less intrusive measures.   
 
                                                
208 Id. at 175-76 (third alteration in original) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 162 (1925)). 
 
209 Airport security may impose secondary screening because a passenger failed primary 
screening or because the passenger caught the attention of a BDO.  See supra Part III.B. 
 
210 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).  The suspected offense would be violation of 49 
C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(2) (prohibiting any attempt to “[e]nter . . . a secured . . . or sterile 
area without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures being applied to 
control access to, or presence or movement in, such areas.”). 
 
211 See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 808 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[T]he rule is easy to 
state: exhaust the other efficient and available means, if any, by which to discover the 
location and identity of the metal activating the magnetometer before utilizing the 
frisk.”). 
 
212 See United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972) (citing United States 
v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972)). 
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[56] As the Second Circuit noted in Albarado, “the public does have the 
expectation, or at least under our Constitution the right to expect, that no 
matter the threat, the search to counter it will be as limited as possible, 
consistent with meeting the threat.”213  It is one thing to subject a person to 
a minimally intrusive magnetometer search for attempting to board a 
plane, but as the Supreme Court recognized in Sitz, the justification for the 
initial intrusion does not extend to any additional searches stemming from 
the initial intrusion.214  By analogy, the reasonableness of a suspicionless 
magnetometer search does not make a pat-down reasonable, absent 
independent justification.215  Extending this reasoning down the chain of 
preflight screening methods, the reasonableness of a pat-down has no 
bearing on the reasonableness of a subsequent strip search or full-body 
scan.  Ultimately, each intrusion must stand on its own reasonableness 
justifications. 
 
[57] Unlike arrestees, prisoners, and schoolchildren, airline 
ticketholders should retain full Fourth Amendment protection.216  It strains 
credulity to argue that citizens surrender full constitutional protection by 
seeking to board an aircraft; and as such, courts should not analogize 
preflight screening to searches of schoolchildren or persons in custody.  
The awareness of ticket purchasers that some manner of screening may 
occur does not exempt the TSA from normal Fourth Amendment 
requirements.217  Even savvy frequent fliers “have the expectation, or at 
least under our Constitution the right to expect, that no matter the threat, 
                                                
213 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806. 
 
214 See Sitz v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 496 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1990); see also 
Albarado, 495 F.2d at 808 (“At the outset it should be noted that any further investigation 
after activation of the magnetometer is for the metal which did the activation; activating 
the magnetometer is not a general license to search for anything.”). 
 
215 See Slocum, 464 F.2d at 1183 (considering the reasonableness of a magnetometer 
search as well as the reasonableness of a subsequent search of a passenger’s bag after the 
passenger failed the magnetometer search). 
 
216 See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text. 
 
217 See Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806. 
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the search to counter it will be as limited as possible, consistent with 
meeting the threat.”218  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
[58] The deployment of full-body scanners in airports throughout the 
United States poses a great threat to passenger privacy.  Although courts 
agree that suspicionless preflight magnetometer searches are reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, there is no agreed-upon standard for 
making this determination.  Nevertheless, a theme has developed that 
magnetometer searches are reasonable because they are minimally 
intrusive and prevent grave danger.219  However, the advent of preflight 
full-body scans renders this paradigm insufficient to preserve passengers’ 
Fourth Amendment protections. 
 
[59] The looming possibility that full-body scans will become 
mandatory for all or some passengers demands an assessment of the 
amount of privacy the Fourth Amendment guarantees in airports.  The use 
of full-body scanners to conduct suspicionless searches in airports is 
repugnant to the fundamental values protected under the Fourth 
Amendment.  For airline ticketholders to have any meaningful Fourth 
Amendment protection, use of full-body scanners should be prohibited 
unless there is probable cause to believe a particular passenger possesses 
contraband that poses a threat to airline security.  A probable cause 
requirement would not upset the TSA’s current screening system or 
unduly burden the TSA’s counterterrorism efforts.  Additionally, it would 
not overrule preflight screening precedent regarding substantially less 
invasive magnetometer searches.  Finally, requiring probable cause for 
full-body scans remains in accord with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
                                                
218 Id. 
 
219 See Slocum, 464 F.2d at 1182 (“[U]se of the magnetometer per se is justified by a 
reasonable governmental interest in protecting national air commerce.”); Epperson, 454 
F.2d at 771 (“We think the search for the sole purpose of discovering weapons and 
preventing air piracy . . . fully justified the minimal invasion of personal privacy by 
magnetometer.”); see also Albarado, 495 F.2d at 803-804 (acknowledging that 
magnetometer searches constitute an exception to the usual warrant requirement). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 1 
 
 38 
which correlates the permissible degree of intrusion with the level of 
suspicion aroused by the individual being searched.220 
 
 
                                                
220 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000). 
